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Much of the comment on Budget 2005 has focused on whether it 
lived up to its advance billing as a “socially inclusive budget” and on 
supposed contrasts between the distributive impact of Budget 2005 
and earlier budgets. Typically these comments are based on small 
numbers of examples,1 and on a framework which measures the 
impact of changes against the benchmark of an “opening budget” 
which would leave welfare rates, tax credits and tax bands frozen in 






Examples of budgetary impact based on only a few examples 
cannot adequately represent the diversity of real world households 
or capture the overall pattern of gains and losses. A tax-benefit 
model, based on a large scale nationally representative survey, is 
needed for these purposes. SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit model, 
simulates the social welfare entitlements and direct tax liabilities of a  
large-scale, nationally representative sample of households (see 
Appendix). This allows a more comprehensive analysis of the 
distributive impact budgetary changes in tax and welfare policy, 
which takes account of the wide variation across families in 
circumstances relevant to their tax and welfare situation. 
In a series of papers in the post-Budget Commentary  and 
elsewhere we have argued that the distributional impact of the 
budget is best measured relative to a “distributionally neutral” 
benchmark. In this article we examine the impact or first-round of 
the income tax and social welfare policy changes announced in 
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1 The Department of Finance analysis in Annex B (assessment using NAPS 
guidelines or “poverty proofing”) is a notable exception. It will be argued, 
however, that the fact that this analysis was based on a “conventional opening 
budget” rather than a “distributionally neutral budget” detracts from its value. 
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Budget 2005. The impact is measured against the neutral yardstick 
provided by a budget indexed in line with likely wage growth of 
about 4½  per cent as forecast in this Commentary. Our results differ 
from those of the Department of Finance (published on Budget day 
as Annex B to the Minister’s speech, dealing with “poverty 
proofing”), because that analysis was undertaken using the general 
convention governing the “opening budget”. 
We have become accustomed to the conventions governing the 
“opening budget”. On the tax side, these involve freezing key 
parameters such as tax rates, bands and credits in nominal terms. 
Similarly, welfare payment rates are frozen in nominal terms under 
the conventional opening budget. But if such an “opening budget” 
were actually implemented, the real income of those dependent on 
welfare benefits would be eroded by inflation. Those in 
employment, on the other hand, would typically experience gains in 
real income because pay growth is usually above price inflation. The 
average tax rate would rise as wage growth brought more income 
into the higher tax bracket. Thus, as argued in a series of papers,2 
the “opening budget” is far from neutral in its impact across the 
income distribution and is therefore unsuitable as a yardstick for 
measuring distributional impacts. 
A “distributionally neutral” budget, giving rise to equal growth in 
income across all income groups, provides a more appropriate 
reference point for analysis of the distributive impact of budgetary 
policy. Under such a budget, major population groups would share 
equally in the benefits of economic growth. Growth in disposable 
income would be the same for all major population groups, and 
shares of income for different groups in the population would 
remain the same after the budget as in the year before. While some 
would argue that the government should undertake more 
redistribution, and others that it should do less, the “distributionally 
neutral” budget provides a yardstick against which the impact of 
actual budgets can reasonably be measured.  
A number of choices arise in implementing such a yardstick. The 
approach taken here involves increasing tax credits, tax bands and 
social welfare payment rates in line with expected growth in wage 
income, the predominant element in national income.3 This “wage-
indexed” budget would give rise to similar percentage income 
growth for low, middle and high-income households. For wage 
earners, increasing tax credits and tax bands in line with wage 
growth ensures that the share of income taken in tax is constant, so 
their net incomes grow at the same rate as gross wages. For those 
depending on social welfare payments for their income, an increase 
in welfare rates equal to the rate of increase in pre-tax wages is the 
key element which ensures that they share equally in the growth in 
income.  
 
2 Callan et al. (1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2002a, 2002b, 2003). 
3 Incomes from self-employment are more variable from year to year than wages, 
so indexing taxes and social welfare to wage growth provides a more stable 
benchmark.  Simply indexing income tax parameters in line with expected wage 
growth would have cost about €450 million; indexing welfare 
payments would have involved a similar cost. Budget 2005 allocated 
over €800 million to increased welfare payments, and about €700 
million to income tax reductions, well above the resources required 
for indexation. The total size of the budgetary package, over and 
above the costs of indexation, was of the order of €600 million on a 





In what follows we use SWITCH to analyse the impact of 
Budget 2005 relative to the distributionally neutral yardstick 
provided by a budget indexed in line with the  Commentary’s forecast 
wage growth of 4½ per cent. Figure 1 shows the percentage gain in 
income for five equal sized income groups (“quintiles”), ranked 
from poorest to richest. This shows gains, over and above 
indexation, averaging just over 4 per cent for the bottom quintile 
and close to 2 per cent for the next quintile. By contrast, the top 40 
per cent of families see their incomes boosted by no more than half 
of one per cent, as compared with a wage-indexed budget. 
Figure 1:  Distributive Impact of Budget 2005 Measured Against 
Wage-indexed Budget 














Thus, our analysis, based on a nationally representative sample, 
indicates that Budget 2005 did favour low-income groups, with 
smaller gains for those on higher incomes.  
  
  3Table 1: Distributive Impact of Budget 2005 and Recent Budgets 
Quintile of income  













  % change in income, actual policy over neutral benchmark 
Bottom  0.8  3.4  4.0  0.0  3.4  4.1 
2
nd 2.4  3.3  2.9  0.4  2.0  1.9 
3
rd 2.8  3.5  1.4  -0.4  0.5  1.1 
4
th 3.3  3.9  0.7  -0.5  0.2  0.7 
Top  4.0  4.4  0.6  -0.7  -0.2  0.4 
 
How does this compare with the distributional impacts seen in 
recent budgets? Table 1 addresses this question, bringing together 
similar analyses of distributional impacts of the past six budgets. 
Our overall conclusion is that Budget 2005 is similar in its impact to 
those of recent years, but contrasts stongly with those of the 1990s. 
Callan et al. (2002, 2003a) found that over the 1990s gains from 
budgetary policy changes were greatest towards the top of the 
income distribution. In more recent years, only Budget 2000 
continued this pattern – it was the last budget for which gains were 
strongly tilted towards the top of the distribution. Budget 2001 
involved a much more even pattern of gains across the distribution. 
Budgets 2002 and 2004 involved substantial gains for those in the 
bottom half of the income distribution, with the greatest gains for 
the 20 per cent of the population with the lowest incomes (the 
bottom quintile). Budget 2003 was roughly neutral for the bottom 
half of the income distribution, with small losses (as against a wage-
indexed benchmark) for the upper half of the distribution. 
Against this background, Budget 2005 can be seen as similar to 
those in 2002 and 2004. The major contrast is not between Budget 
2005 and recent budgets, but between the Budgets of 2001 to 2005  
and those of the 1990s.  
 
  A similar analysis was undertaken to assess the likely impact of the 
budget on relative income poverty, e.g., the proportion of persons 
living below half average income. Although it is not a target under 
the National Anti-Poverty Strategy, it is clearly germane to the long-
term evolution of poverty (see Whelan et al., 2003). It is also one of 
the key indicators of progress in terms of social inclusion agreed by 
the EU Council at Laeken.  
3. 





The central indicator agreed at Laeken was the proportion of the 
population falling below 60 per cent of median income. Our 
calculations suggest that the immediate impact of Budget 2005 will 
be to reduce this figure by about half a percentage point. For lines at 
50 per cent of median income we find a similar effect, but at 70 per 
cent of median income the impact is smaller, at about 0.2 
percentage points. More sophisticated measures which take account 
of the depth of poverty (how far incomes fall below the poverty 
line) also show a small fall in the extent of poverty arising from 
Budget 2005. 
 
  4A systematic analysis, using SWITCH, the ESRI tax-benefit 
model, reveals that the direct tax and welfare provisions4 in Budget 
2005 were indeed quite progressively structured with the greatest 
gains for those with least income. Gains for the bottom quintile (the 
poorest 20 per cent of the population) were of the order of 4 per 
cent as against gains of less than 1 per cent for the top half of the 
income distribution). The shape of the budgetary impact is similar 
to that of Budget 2004, and that of Budget 2002. The major 
contrast is between Budgets of the past 5 years and those of the 
1990s and the year 2000, in which typically the greatest gains went 
to those at the top of the income distribution. These estimates are, 
of course, calculated on the technical assumption that there is no 
change in labour market behaviour in response to the tax and 
welfare policy changes. While identifying likely effects is an ongoing 
area of research, best evidence to date (Callan, van Soest and Walsh, 
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4 Indirect taxes are outside the scope of the SWITCH model, but the fact that 
excise taxes, which are heavily incident on low income groups, fell in real terms 
means that the  progressive pattern may have been reinforced.   6
Appendix: SWITCH: the ESRI Tax-Benefit Model 
Tax-benefit models are needed for a comprehensive assessment of 
the effects of tax and welfare policy changes, taking into account the 
wide variation in individual and family circumstances relevant to 
welfare entitlements and tax liabilities. SWITCH, the ESRI tax-
benefit model, is a well-established tool for analysing the “first-
round” effects of tax and welfare policy changes. The version of 
SWITCH used in the present analysis is based on the 2000 Living in 
Ireland Survey, a large-scale nationally representative survey of 
households undertaken by the ESRI. The model database has been 
adjusted to ensure that it reflects recent changes in incomes, 
employment, unemployment and population − and draws on 
projections of such changes for the year 2005 to provide a suitable 
framework for the analysis of Budget 2005.  
The model uses detailed information on individual and family 
circumstances (including information on wages and hours of work 
for those in paid employment, and on labour force status and 
receipt of social welfare benefits for those not in paid employment) 
to assess the social welfare entitlements and tax liabilities of each 
family in the database. The model can therefore simulate for each 
family the disposable income they would receive under actual policy, 
or under alternative policies of interest. 
Using these detailed calculations it is possible to summarise the 
impact of policy changes in many different ways. Here we focus in 
particular on how the average gain or loss varies depending on the 
income of the family. Family units are ranked by income, adjusting 
for differences in family size and composition using a simple 
equivalence scale: 1 for the first adult in the family, 0.66 for a 
second adult and 0.33 for children. Thus, a married couple with a 
disposable income of €200 per week would have an “equivalised” 
income of just over €120 (i.e., €200 divided by 1.66). A married 
couple with one child would have an equivalised income of just 
over €100 (i.e., €200 divided by 1.99 (=1+0.66+0.33)). Families can 
then be divided into equal sized groups (5 “quintiles” or 10 
“deciles), from poorest to richest. 
One underlying technical assumption is that labour market 
behaviour and wage rates are the same under each policy; but the 
model can shed light on how such behaviour may change by 
identifying the impact of policy changes on financial incentives to 
work. For a study of behavioural labour market responses to tax 
and welfare changes see Callan et al. (2003a).  
 
 